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Introduction	 ﾠ
The gains from long-distance international trade have been understood and exploited 
since prehistoric times. Our pre-urban ancestors were benefitting from long-distance trade in 
obsidian some 10,000 years ago, Plato’s Academy was built on the profits of Athenian silver 
exports, and Rome was not built in a day partly because goods moved too slowly in the vast 
Roman trade network. 
Much has changed since Roman times. Whereas trade was once dominated by the 
movement of goods that could only be produced, harvested or mined regionally, today the trade 
landscape is dominated by two striking facts. The first is the rise of intra-industry trade, that is, 
two-way trade in similar products. Chinese consumers can now buy a midsize car from Toyota 
(Japan), Kia (Korea), General Motors (United States), and Chery (China). Ditto for consumers in 
Japan, Korea, and the United States. The second striking fact is that world trade is dominated by 
huge and extraordinarily productive firms. 
These two facts combined have transformed the way we think about the gains from trade. 
In the past we focused on gains that stemmed either from endowment differences (wheat for iron 
ore) or inter-industry comparative advantage (Ricardo’s cloth for port). Today we focus both on 
the variety gains from intra-industry trade and on the efficiencies associated with shifting labor 
and capital out of small, less productive firms and into large, more productive firms.  
In what follows we describe the gains from intra-industry trade with particular emphasis 
on the consequences for the firms involved, including their workers and owners. The recent and 
rapid reduction in trade costs (‘Globalization’) has impacted welfare in many different ways. 
Here we focus on three sources of gains from intra-industry trade.  The first source is driven by 
economies of scale on the production side along with product differentiation in the eyes of the 
consumer.
2 Intra-industry trade allows firms to increase the scale of production (lowering 
average costs) while giving consumers more product choices (as well as lower prices).   
The second source of gains stems from a ‘reallocation’ effect at the firm level that was 
described by Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003).  Essential to these gains is the notion of 
firm heterogeneity i.e., that performance varies across firms (because, for example, some firms 
are more productive than others). Globalization generates both winners and losers among firms 
                                                 
1 Financial support for Trefler’s research is from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (SSHRC). His research would not have been possible without the tremendous support of John Baldwin and 
Alla Lileeva. 
2 Paul Krugman earned the Nobel Prize in 2008 in large part for his work highlighting how economies of 
scale and product differentiation lead to intra-industry trade and this “new” source of gains from trade.  This 
research is developed in Krugman (1979, 1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985).  The press release by the Nobel 
committee is available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2008/press.html. Helpman (2011, 
Ch. 4) provides an accessible overview of this theory and the associated empirical work.   2 
in the same sector and these effects are magnified by heterogeneity. Better performing firms 
thrive and expand, while worse performing firms contract and even shut down. This generates a 
new source of gains from trade: as production is concentrated towards better-performing firms, 
the overall efficiency of the sector improves. An analogy with high school math may help here. 
Imagine that your teacher allows you to drop your worst test and put more weight on your best 
test.  This raises your average, just as globalization raises average sectoral efficiency.  Better 
performing firms not only expand domestically, they expand internationally because they have a 
greater incentive to engage in the global economy, either by exporting, by outsourcing some of 
their intermediate production processes abroad, or by building plants abroad (multinationals). 
These are options that require up-front fixed costs so that, as in Melitz (2003), only the best 
performing firms have the sales levels that would justify incurring such fixed costs. 
The third source of gains from trade deals with innovation. The development of new 
productivity- and profit-enhancing products and processes also involves substantial fixed costs. 
The larger scale of production associated with trade integration makes it more attractive for some 
firms to incur these up-front investments, thereby raising their productivity and profits, and 
thereby increasing the gains from trade. See Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Lileeva and 
Trefler (2010) as well as Bustos (2010) and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011).  Note that this third 
source of gains deals with within-firm efficiency; in contrast, the second source of gains above 
deals with between-firm or allocative efficiency. 
This paper reviews these three sources of gains from trade both theoretically and 
empirically.  Our empirical evidence will be centered on the experience of Canada following its 
closer economic integration with the United States (the largest example of bilateral intra-industry 
trade in the world!); but we will also describe related evidence for other countries. 
The related literature is huge. Here we focus on firms that expand internationally via 
exporting as in Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2003).   Another related research topic analyzes 
how firm boundaries evolve across borders as firms locate key parts of their production chain 
abroad (e.g. outsourcing and multinationals).  Antras and Rossi-Hansberg (2010) and Helpman 
(2011, Ch.6) provide recent surveys of this important new research topic. 
Intra-ﾭ‐Industry	 ﾠTrade:	 ﾠA	 ﾠFew	 ﾠFacts	 ﾠand	 ﾠExamples	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠRise	 ﾠof	 ﾠIntra-ﾭ‐Industry	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠ
Figure 1 documents the rise of intra-industry trade as a share of overall trade for the 
world over the last half-century.
3  In order to measure intra-industry trade, one needs to start with 
an industrial classification system that assigns all documented trade flows to a particular 
“industry”.  One can then categorize all bilateral trade flows as either intra-industry (two way 
trade within the same industry classification code) or inter-industry (imports and exports in 
separate industry codes).  The United Nations uses such a classification system known as the 
Standard International Trade Classification, or SITC, to categorize all world trade flows that it 
reports.  In its most detailed form, there are 1,161 separate industry codes, but these industries 
are often aggregated into a smaller subset of industries.  Figure 1 shows the time trend for the 
share of intra-industry trade according to this most detailed classification, and a more aggregated 
                                                 
3 The data in Figure 1 come from Bruhlhart (2009).  That paper documents the many facets of the rise of 
intra-industry trade from 1962-2006, and describes all the associated measurement issues.  We thank Marius 
Brulhart for generously sharing his data.   3 
version (with 59 separate industry codes).  Mechanically, the share of intra-industry rises with 
the level of aggregation for the industrial classification system (if there was just a single 
aggregate industry code, then all trade would be “intra” to this aggregated industry).  However, 
the time trends for both series are very similar: intra-industry trade (relative to inter-industry 
trade) grew rapidly from 1962 to the mid-1990s, before stabilizing at a substantially higher level.  
Looking across countries, there is a strong correlation between the share of intra-industry trade 
and development: as countries industrialize, they produce and export differentiated manufactured 
goods that are similar to other brands of goods that are imported.  However, it is not just the 
richest countries whose trade is dominated by intra-industry trade.  Some of the countries with 
the highest shares of intra-industry trade in 2000 were newly industrializing nations such as the 
Czech Republic (77%), the Slovak Republic (76%), Mexico (73%), and Hungary (72%).  For 
comparison, the U.S. share of intra-industry trade in 2000 was 69%.
4  Most recently, China’s 
share of intra-industry trade has risen above the 50% mark. 
Why does a country both export and import goods that are similar?  One major reason is 
that those goods are similar, but not identical.  Consider the world trade in automobiles that was 
previously mentioned.  Consumers in a car-producing country are not limited to buying the car 
models that are produced domestically: many of those consumers choose to buy different models 
that are produced elsewhere and imported.  Brand proliferation is then moderated by economies 
of scale: producing the first unit of a new good is substantially more expensive than the 
production cost for the subsequent ones (especially if the good is produced on a very large scale).  
We now highlight how the combination of product differentiation and economies of scale 
generates intra-industry trade and gains from such trade using a highly stylized theoretical 
example. The goal is to motivate the first source of gains from trade that we listed in the 
introduction, and to show how such gains arise even when two identical countries open up to 
trade.  This provides a stark contrast with the gains from inter-industry trade which arise only 
from exploiting differences across countries such as differences in technology (some countries 
are relatively better than others at producing certain types of goods) or differences in factor 
supplies (production of some goods requires certain factors of production that are relatively more 
abundant, hence cheaper, in some countries relative to others).
5 
Gains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠIntra-ﾭ‐IndustryTrade:	 ﾠAn	 ﾠInitial	 ﾠExample	 ﾠ
In our highly stylized example, two identical countries produce highly differentiated 
widget varieties subject to the same technology that features economies of scale.  To be specific, 
assume that one worker can produce 1 widget, but that production of any new variety of widgets 
requires 4 workers to cover fixed overhead costs: this implies decreasing average costs of 
production as the fixed cost is spread over an increasing number of output units (hence the 
economies of scale).  Also to be specific, suppose that both countries have a fixed supply of 12 
workers.  If they do not trade, then each country can produce: 
(a) 8 units of 1 variety, or  
(b) 2 units each of 2 different varieties.  
Allowing countries to trade leads to a new possibility that is better than either (a) or (b). Suppose 
that each country produces 8 units of 1 variety (as in (a)) and exports 4 of these units to the other 
                                                 
4 See the OECD Economic Outlook (2002, Ch. 6).  All the listed shares of intra-industry trade are based on 
the aggregated industrial classification code from Figure 1. 
5 Differences in consumer tastes across countries can also be a source of inter-industry trade but most of the 
world’s inter-industry trade is driven by supply-side differences.   4 
country. Consumers are now consuming 4 units of the home variety and 4 units of the foreign 
variety. This is preferred to either of the no-trade production plans above. Compared to (b), there 
are the same number of varieties (2), but more of each variety (4 versus 2). Compared to (a), 
there are the same number of units (8), but more varieties (2 versus 1).  Note how trade gives 
consumers a better tradeoff between more consumption units and more product variety.  
Economic integration allows production of each individual variety to be consolidated for the 
whole integrated market; given increasing returns to scale, this reduces average production costs.   
At the same time, product variety increases because consumers can buy varieties produced 
anywhere in the integrated market. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, the rise in intra-industry trade – two-way trade in varieties of a 
good – has been a dominant trend in world trade at least since the 1960s. Two historic examples 
serve to bring home this point about the gains from variety. 
Trade	 ﾠAgreements	 ﾠand	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠIntegration	 ﾠ
One of the most salient examples of economic integration between similar countries has 
occurred between the United States and Canada over the last 50 years.  This integration started in 
the mid- sixties for a single sector with the implementation of the North American Auto Pact.  
Prior to 1964 (the signing of the Pact), most car models were produced both in the United States 
(for U.S. consumers) and in Canada (for Canadian consumers).   High tariffs on auto trade made 
it uneconomical to export most car models across the border.  Since the Canadian auto market 
was roughly one-tenth the size of the U.S. market, this implied substantial scale disadvantages 
for production in the Canadian market: labor productivity there was about 30% below the U.S. 
level.
6  The Pact established a free trade area for autos that allowed manufacturers to consolidate 
the production of particular car models in one country, and export that model to consumers in the 
other country.  For example, General Motors cut in half the number of models assembled in 
Canada.  However, auto production in Canada increased as the remaining models produced in 
Canada supplied the U.S. market as well as the Canadian one.  Canadian automotive exports to 
the United States increased from $16 million in 1962 to $2.4 billion in 1968.  That same year, 
U.S. automotive exports to Canada were valued at $2.9 billion: intra-industry trade in action.  
Today, $85 billion worth of automotive products cross the U.S.-Canada border each year – 
roughly half in each direction: that represents over $350 million of cross-border exchanges per 
average work day!  The productivity gains associated with this consolidation were also 
substantial: by the early 1970s, the 30% labor productivity shortfall relative to the United States 
had disappeared. 
Later on, this transformation of the automotive industry was extended to include Mexico.  
In 1989, Volkswagen consolidated its North American operations in Mexico, shutting down its 
plant in Pennsylvania.  This process continued with the implementation of NAFTA (the North 
American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico).  In 1994 
Volkswagen started producing the new Beetle for the whole North American market in that same 
Mexican plant. 
This consolidation in response to closer economic integration with the United States was 
not limited to the auto industry. Baldwin, Beckstead and Caves (2002), Baldwin, Caves, and Gu 
(2005), and Baldwin and Gu (2006b) document a dramatic reduction in the product 
                                                 
6 The U.S. market was large enough that assembly lines could be dedicated to one particular car model, 
while Canadian assembly lines had to switch across models, involving costly down-time and reconfiguration costs.  
It also forced Canadian plants to hold substantially higher inventory levels.   5 
diversification of Canadian plants across the entire Canadian manufacturing sector following the 
implementation of the Canada-U.S Free Trade Agreement in 1989 (NAFTA’s precursor).  This 
reduction in product diversification implies that Canadian plants concentrated their production 
on a smaller subset of products.  Indeed, Baldwin, Caves and Gu (2005) also report that the 
decrease in product diversification was accompanied by substantial increases in production runs 
for individual products.
7 
Another prominent example of economic integration has taken place in Europe over the 
last half century.  In 1957, the major countries of Western Europe established a free trade area in 
manufactured goods (the European Economic Community or EEC). The result was a rapid 
growth of trade, especially intra-industry trade. Trade within the EEC grew twice as fast as world 
trade during the 1960s, and intra-industry trade as a share of EEC trade more than doubled from 
1960 to 1990. Economic integration has continued in Europe as more countries have joined the 
free trade area (which is today called the European Union or EU) and as a subset of EU countries 
have adopted a common currency (the Euro) since 1999. Eurozone members have experienced 
strong trade growth (especially intra-industry trade growth) relative to non-EU countries and 
even relative to EU countries that have not adopted the Euro. 
A substantial portion of the increased trade that comes with economic integration also 
delivers increased product variety to consumers.  Around the world, countries that are part of a 
free trade area (such as NAFTA and the EU, but also lots of other regional agreements around 
the world) exchange substantially more products with one-another than with countries outside of 
their free trade area.  Even the adoption of the Euro (among countries that had already nearly 
completed integrated into a single trade area) led to a substantial increase in the number of 
products traded within the Euro area.  The benefits of this additional product variety for 
consumers are also substantial.  Broda and Weinstein (2006) estimate that the number of 
available products in U.S. imports tripled in the thirty-year time span from 1972 to 2001.  They 
further estimate that this increased product variety for U.S. consumers represented a welfare gain 
equal to 2.6% of U.S. GDP! Feenstra (2010) estimates that the worldwide consumer gains are 
equal to between 9% and 15% of world GDP. 
Gains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠwith	 ﾠHeterogeneous	 ﾠFirms	 ﾠ
Our stylized example with two countries and identical production technologies 
highlighted one important channel for the gains from intra-industry trade via the consolidation of 
production (and the associated expansion of consumed varieties).  However, that simple example 
cannot help us predict how individual firms will respond to trade, and misses the other two 
sources of gains from trade that we mentioned in the introduction.  In order to analyze those 
other two sources, we first need to develop a model of trade with heterogeneous firms (i.e. where 
performance varies across different firms).  We can then capture how firms with different 
characteristics respond differently to trade.  Consider the case from the previous example where 
opening to trade leads to a transition from production plan (a) where each country produces 2 
varieties to production plan (b) where each country produces 1 variety.  In the real world, those 
products are associated with the firms that produce them. Opening up to trade therefore implies 
                                                 
7 This process is even evident in the Canadian wine industry, an industry that exclusively produced low-end 
wines that could not possibly compete with Californian giants such as Gallo. In response to the Agreement, 
Canadian manufactures dramatically reduced the number of varietals produced and focused on the varietals used to 
produce ice wine. The industry is now healthier than ever. See Beamish and Celly (2003).   6 
that 1 of the 2 firms in each country shuts down while the remaining firms expand production 
(from 2 units to 8 units).  Which firms expand and which ones exit?  In this example, firm labels 
are inconsequential because all the firms look exactly the same.  We now investigate how these 
predictions change once we introduce performance differences across the firms.
8  
Demand,	 ﾠCost,	 ﾠand	 ﾠProfit	 ﾠ
Consider an industry where many firms compete by offering different products that are 
nevertheless close substitutes for one another (at least, as compared to products in other 
industries).  For simplicity, we associate a firm with a single product.
9 The demand for each 
firm’s product is represented by a standard downward sloping demand curve as represented in 
panel (a) of Figure 2.  Due to the competition across firms and products, this is a residual 
demand curve: this demand depends on the behavior of other competing firms in the market.  
Increases in competition, associated with increases in the number of competing products and/or 
lower average prices of those competing products will shift in this residual demand (see graph).  
On the other hand, increases in the overall size of the market (holding the number of products 
and their prices fixed) will rotate the demand curve out (see graph).  This implies that an increase 
in market size (holding competition fixed) would lead to the same proportional increase in 
quantity sold for the firm at any given price.
10 
On the production side, the economies of scale arise from a fixed cost that a firm must 
initially incur to develop a product and set up its initial production.  This cost, associated with 
firm entry into the market, is sunk once a firm initiates production.  The marginal cost of 
production is assumed constant. 
This technology is represented graphically in panel (b) of Figure 2 with a flat marginal 
cost curve (MC=c) and a decreasing average cost curve (AC).  The shaded area represents the 
total production costs for a firm producing q units of output.  This cost can be divided into 
operating costs (the darker shaded area below the MC curve), and the fixed entry cost (the lighter 
shaded area above the MC curve).
11 
In this model, every firm has market power because it produces its own version (or 
brand) of a product that is differentiated – hence the downward-sloping firm residual demand 
curve.  However this firm’s market power is limited by the responses of other firms in the market 
(entry and pricing decisions) that affect the firm’s residual demand.  To keep the analysis as 
simple as possible, we assume that there are a large number of competing firms, so large that no 
firm can ‘move the market’ in the sense of doing something that could alter its residual demand 
curve. Each individual firm therefore maximizes profits subject to its residual demand curve.  
                                                 
8 The model we introduce in this section is a simplified version of the one developed in Melitz and 
Ottaviano (2008). 
9 Eckel and Neary (2010), Bernard et al (forthcoming), and Mayer et al (2011) develop related models that 
further incorporate the firms’ production and export decisions across multiple products. 
10 The equation for the demand facing a firm that is used in what follows is Q = S (1/ n)!b(p ! p} [ ] , 
where Q is the quantity of output demanded, S is the total output of the industry, n is the number of firms in the 
industry, b > 0 is a constant term representing the responsiveness of a firm’s sales to its price, p is the price charged 
by the firm itself, and  p is the average price charged by its competitors. This demand equation may be given the 
following intuitive justification: If all firms charge the same price, each will have a market share 1/n. A firm 
charging more than the average of other firms will have a smaller market share, whereas a firm charging less will 
have a larger share. 
11 Note that the distance between the AC and MC curves equals the portion of the fixed entry cost f that is 
paid per unit of output produced.   7 
This leads to the standard outcome whereby each firm chooses an output level q that equalizes 
marginal cost and marginal revenue, as shown in Figure 3.  That graph shows the same cost and 
demand curves from Figure 2, and adds the marginal revenue curve (MR) associated with the 
demand curve.  The output choice q leads to a corresponding price p on the demand curve, and a 
markup   over marginal cost.  The two shaded areas represents the firm’s operating profit 
 (revenue  minus operating cost  ).  This operating profit does not take into 
consideration the fixed cost f that is paid upon entry.  The firm’s net profit is then  , 
and is represented by the darker shaded area (recall that the lighter shaded area between the AC 
and MC curves represents the fixed cost f).   
In Figure 3, the cost and demand curves are drawn such that the firm’s net profit is 
positive.  If all firms had access to the same technology (same entry cost f and marginal 
production cost c), then this could not represent a long run equilibrium with entry: a prospective 
entrant would recognize that they could earn a positive net profit (an operating profit exceeding 
the entry cost) and would therefore enter.  More competition via entry would shift in the residual 
demand curve as we previously discussed, leading to an equilibrium where all firms earn zero net 
profits.  This is the standard monopolistic competition equilibrium. 
Differences	 ﾠin	 ﾠFirm	 ﾠPerformance	 ﾠ
However, we want to focus on the case where firms do not have access to the same 
technology.  We consider the case where firms have different marginal costs of production  . 
For simplicity, we still assume that demand for all products is symmetric and hence that all firms 
face the same residual demand curve.
12 Figure 4 shows the consequences of differences in 
marginal cost for firm performance.  In panel (a), we see that firm 1 has a lower marginal cost (
) than firm 2 ( ).  This leads firm 1 to choose a higher output level than firm 2 ( ), 
associated with a lower price ( ).  Note, however, that firm 1 still sets a higher markup 
than firm 2:  .
13 This, in turn, entails that firm 1 earns a higher operating profit 
than firm 2:   (represented by the shaded areas in panel (a) of Figure 4).
14  We assume 
that all firms face the same entry cost f so firm 1 also earns higher net profits:  .  
(Differences in fixed costs would not affect firm behavior in terms of price and output.) 
We can thus summarize all the relevant performance differences that result from marginal 
cost differences across firms.  Compared to a firm with higher marginal cost, a firm with a lower 
marginal cost will: (1) Set a lower price, but at a higher markup over marginal cost, (2) produce 
more output, and (3) earn higher profits. 
Panel (b) in Figure 4 shows how firm profit varies with its marginal cost  .  As we just 
mentioned, both operating and net profit will be decreasing functions of marginal cost (the 
difference between the two is just the fixed entry cost f).  Going back to panel (a), we see that a 
firm can earn a positive operating profit so long as its marginal cost is below the intercept of the 
                                                 
12 Product-quality differences between firms would lead to very similar predictions for firm performance as 
the ones we now derive for cost differences. 
13 This is a consequence of the marginal revenue curve being steeper than the demand curve. 
14 Operating profit   can be re-written as the product of the markup   times 
output  . Firm 1 sets a higher markup and sells more output, leading to higher operating profits than firm 2. 
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demand curve on the vertical axis.  Let  denote this cost cutoff.  A firm with a marginal cost   
above this cutoff is effectively “priced-out” of the market and would earn negative operating 
profits if it were to produce any output.  Such a firm would choose to shut down and not produce 
(earning zero operating profit but incurring a net profit loss   due to the fixed cost). Why 
would such a firm enter in the first place?  Clearly, it would not if it knew about its high cost   
prior to entry and paying the fixed cost f.  
We assume that entrants face some randomness about their future production cost  .  
This randomness disappears only after f is paid and is sunk. Thus, some firms will regret their 
entry decision as their net profit is negative.  This is the case for firm 2 in panel (b).
15  On the 
other hand, some firms discover that their production cost  is very low and earn a high (and 
positive) net profit.  Firms consider all these possible outcomes, captured by the net profit curve 
in panel (b) of Figure 4 when they make their entry decision.  Firms anticipate that there is a 
range of lower costs where net profits are positive (shaded area to the left above the horizontal 
axis), and another range of higher costs where net profits are negative (shaded area to the right 
below the horizontal axis).
16 In the long run equilibrium, firms enter until their expected net 
profit across all potential cost levels  is driven to zero. If every cost level   from 0 to  is 
equally likely, then this equilibrium is reached when the two shaded areas are equal.
17 
The	 ﾠEffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠTrade:	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠIntegration	 ﾠ
Panel (b) of Figure 4 summarizes the industry equilibrium for a given market size.  It tells 
us which range of firms survive and produce (with cost  below  ), and how their profits will 
vary with their cost levels  .  What happens when economies integrate into a single larger 
market?  A larger market can support a larger number of firms than a smaller market, which 
implies more competition in the larger market.  Figure 2 showed how increased competition – 
absent any increase in market size – leads to an inward shift of each firm’s residual demand 
curve.  On the other hand we also saw that, holding competition fixed (the number of firms and 
the prices they set), a larger market rotates out the residual demand curves for all firms.  Putting 
these two effects together gives us the combined effect of increased market size (including the 
associated increase in competition) on the firms’ residual demand curve.  This is depicted in 
panel (a) of Figure 5 as the shift from demand curve D to  .  Notice how the demand curve 
shifts in for the smaller firms (lower output levels) that operate on the higher part of the demand 
curve: here, the effect of tougher competition dominates.  However, this demand curve also 
rotates out for the larger firms that operate on the lower part of the demand curve: here, the effect 
of the larger market size dominates. 
Panel (b) of Figure 5 shows the consequences of this demand change for the operating 
profits of firms with different cost levels  .  The decrease in demand for the smaller firms 
translates into a new lower cost cutoff  : Firms with the highest cost levels (above  ) cannot 
                                                 
15 Firm 2’s marginal cost  is below the cutoff  , so it still earns a positive operating profit and will 
therefore choose to produce and not exit. 
16 Recall that any firm with marginal cost  above the cutoff  exits and incurs a net profit loss  .  
This is a lower bound for net profits. 
17 The region above  will be important below when we discuss the exporting decision. 
∗ c i c
− f
i c
i c
i c
i c i c max c
i c
* c
i c
Dƹ′
i c
∗ƹ′ c
∗ƹ′ c
2 c
∗ c
i c
∗ c − f
∗ c  9 
survive the decrease in demand and are forced to exit.  On the other hand, the flatter demand 
curve is advantageous to firms with the lowest cost levels: they can adapt to the increased 
competition by lowering their markup (and hence their price) and gaining some additional 
market share.
18  This translates into increased profits (both operating and net) for the best 
performing firms with the lowest cost levels  .  Figure 5 illustrates how increased market size 
generates both winners and losers amongst firms in an industry.  The low cost firms thrive and 
increase their profits and market shares, while the high cost firms contract, and the highest cost 
firms exit.   
Although integration does not directly affect firm productivity, it nevertheless generates 
an overall increase in aggregate productivity as market shares are reallocated from the low 
productivity firms (those with high cost) to the high productivity ones (those with low cost).  
Again, think back to our example of  your average grade for a class: if your better performing 
test scores are given higher weights, and you are allowed to drop your lowest score, than your 
average for the class will increase. 
Trade	 ﾠCosts,	 ﾠExport	 ﾠDecisions,	 ﾠand	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠLiberalization	 ﾠ
We have just modeled economic integration as an increase in market size.  This implicitly 
assumes that this integration occurs to such an extent that a single combined market is formed.  
In reality, integration rarely goes that far: initial trade costs are not so high that there is no trade 
prior to liberalization; and liberalization does not fully eliminate those costs: it reduces them.  
What happens to our key prediction regarding the effect of integration on aggregate productivity 
via reallocations?  The main punch-line is that this kind of trade liberalization has a very similar 
effect to the simpler case of full integration that we previously described. Partial trade 
liberalization generates both winners and losers: the better performing firms expand while the 
worse performing ones contract and the worst performing ones exit.  This generates the same 
type of reallocation effect previously described and leads to a rise in aggregate productivity.
 19  
Adding trade costs also allows us to analyze an important new implication of the 
theoretical model regarding the firm export decision.  With trade costs, exporting is profitable 
only for a subset of better performing firms.  There are some firms who do not export and only 
serve domestic consumers (so long as their operating profit from doing so is positive).  We now 
extend our theoretical model to incorporate trade costs and this firm export decision.  We can no 
longer analyze a single integrated (or entirely non-integrated) market: we need to jointly look at 
the firms’ decisions in both the domestic and export markets.  For simplicity, we consider a 
special case where both countries are symmetric, so demand conditions in both the domestic and 
export markets will be identical. 
Assume that a firm must incur an additional trade cost t for each unit of output that it sells 
to customers across the border.  This trade cost will induce a firm to set different prices in its 
                                                 
18 Recall that the lower the firm’s marginal cost  , the higher its markup over marginal cost  .  
High cost firms are already setting low markups, and cannot lower their prices to induce positive demand, as this 
would mean pricing below their marginal cost of production. 
19 The model developed here is a special case of a more general version analyzed by Melitz and Ottaviano 
(2008). That paper develops a model with multiple countries of different sizes; and with arbitrary trade costs 
between any country pair (though the trade costs are proportional to production costs instead of per output unit as in 
the current version).  The paper shows that the effects of multilateral liberalization (all countries proportionally 
reduce trade costs) are very similar to the case of full economic integration that leads to a single larger market. 
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export market relative to its domestic market.  This will lead to different quantities sold in each 
market, and ultimately to different profit levels earned in each market.
20  
Consider the case of firms located in Home.  Their situation regarding their domestic 
(Home) market is exactly as was illustrated in Figure 4, except that all the outcomes such as 
price, output, and profit relate to the domestic market only.  Now consider the decisions of firms 
1 and 2 (with marginal costs   and  ) in the export (Foreign) market.  They face the same 
demand curve in Foreign as they do in Home (the two countries are identical).  The only 
difference is that the each firm’s marginal cost in the export market is shifted up by the trade cost 
t.  Figure 6 shows the situation for the two firms in both markets. 
What are the effects of the trade cost on the firms’ decisions regarding the export market?  
We know from our previous analysis that a higher marginal cost induces a firm to raise its price, 
which leads to a lower output quantity sold and to lower profits.  We also know that if marginal 
cost is raised above a threshold level  , then a firm cannot profitably operate in that market.  
This is what happens to firm 2 in Figure 6.  Firm 2 can profitably operate in its domestic market, 
because its cost there is below the threshold:  .  However it cannot profitably operate in the 
export market because its cost in the export market is above the threshold:  .  Firm 1, on 
the other hand, has a low enough cost such that it can profitably operate in both the domestic and 
export markets:  .   
We can extend this prediction to all firms based on their marginal cost  .  Panel (a) of 
Figure 7 separates a firm’s operating profit into a portion earned from domestic sales, and a 
portion earned from export sales. (Both portions are functions of a firm’s marginal cost  as in 
Figure 4.)  Note how the trade cost t shifts down the operating profit for the export market 
relative to the domestic market.
21  The figure shows how firm 1 earns positive operating profits 
from sales in both the domestic and export markets.  However, firm 2 only earns positive 
operating profits from sales in the domestic market: If firm 2 exported, it would earn negative 
operating profits from this activity – and thus chooses not to do so.  Any firm with cost above 
 will be in this same situation and therefore will not export.  As we have previously 
discussed, we know that firms with a cost above   would also earn negative operating profits 
from their operations in their domestic market.  Those firms cannot profitably serve either 
market and exit.  Panel (a) of Figure 7 summarizes these firm-level decisions: as before, the 
worst performing firms exit, and the best performing firms export.  There is now a new 
intermediate range of firms who serve their domestic market but do not export.  
Panel (b) of Figure 7 summarizes the effects of trade liberalization (a reduction in the 
trade cost t) for those firm decisions.  The figure shows the same two operating profit curves 
from panel (a) both before and after (dashed curves) trade liberalization.  The operating profit for 
the domestic market shifts down due to the increase in competition (which shifts in the residual 
demand curve as shown in panel (a) of Figure 2).  This induces some additional exit as some of 
the higher cost firms that used to produce no longer earn a positive operating profit after trade 
liberalization.  On the other hand, the operating profit for the export market shifts up due to the 
                                                 
20 As each firm’s marginal cost is constant (does not vary with production levels), those decisions regarding 
pricing and quantity sold in each market can be separated: a decision regarding the domestic market will have no 
impact on the profitability of different decisions for the export market. 
21 Because the only difference between the domestic and export markets is the additional per-unit trade cost 
t, the horizontal distance between the two curves is equal to the trade cost t. 
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direct effect of the lower trade cost.
22  The lower trade cost induces a subset of firms to start 
exporting.  Exporting was not profitable for those firms when the trade cost was high, but 
becomes profitable once trade liberalization reduces that trade cost.   
Putting together the downward shift in domestic operating profits and the upward shift in 
export operating profits, we see that trade liberalization generates both winners and losers – just 
as in the case of economic integration.  Non-exporters lose because they only incur the losses 
from the lower domestic profits.  Exporters, on the other hand, stand to gain as they can make up 
for the loss of domestic profits with profits earned from exporting.  This is the case for some, but 
not all of the exporters. 
Gains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠInter-ﾭ‐Firm	 ﾠReallocations:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠGreat	 ﾠFTA	 ﾠExperiment	 ﾠ
We have seen how the introduction of performance differences across firms substantially 
alters predictions about the effects of trade policy (both market integration and trade-cost 
reductions).  In this section we visit these predictions empirically by examining the impact of the 
Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the distribution of Canadian manufacturing 
plants.
23 
Performance	 ﾠDifferences	 ﾠAcross	 ﾠProducers	 ﾠ
When marginal costs are low we typically expect productivity to be high. Therefore, the 
inverse of marginal costs (1/c) is always proxied in empirical work by productivity. Here we will 
use labor productivity i.e., value added per employee, where value added is sales less the costs of 
intermediate inputs. 
Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows that there is a remarkable degree of dispersion in plant 
productivity.  Consider the curve labeled ‘1996.’ It summarizes the productivity distribution of 
all 35,000 Canadian manufacturing plants in 1996. The horizontal axis is the log of labor 
productivity. The vertical axis is proportional to the share of plants with the indicated level of 
productivity. To get a sense of the degree of productivity dispersion, suppose that productivity at 
plant A is one log point higher than at plant B. This is equivalent to saying that plant A is 3 times 
more productive than plant B. If A is three log points more productive than B then A is 20 times 
more productive than B.
24 Productivity heterogeneity is more than an interesting theoretical 
possibility: it is a pervasive feature of all economies including, for example, the United States 
(Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum 2003) and many European economies (Mayer and 
Ottaviano 2007).
25 
                                                 
22 Increased competition in the export market reduces operating profits, but this effect is dominated by the 
direct effect of the trade cost reduction. 
23 We use plants (a specific production location) as the basic production unit for our empirical analysis; this 
corresponds to the firms from the theoretical model. 
24 Let ϕA and ϕB be productivities of A and B and suppose the log of productivities are 1 point apart i.e., 
ln(ϕA) − ln(ϕB) = 1. From the property of logs, ϕA / ϕB = e
1 = 2.7 ≈	 ﾠ3. For a difference of 3 log points, e
3 ≈ 20. 
25 To ensure that dispersion is driven by within-industry rather than between-industry differences in labor 
productivity, we scale each plant’s log productivity by subtracting median log productivity for the plant’s 4-digit 
SIC industry. Thus ‘0’ corresponds to the log productivity of the median plant in the industry. Also, the frequencies 
are weighted by plant employment; otherwise, the figure is dominated by tiny plants that account for only a tiny 
fraction of total employment. (The median plant had only 12 employees in 1988.) Thus, for example, the average 
height of the 1996 curve on the interval (-1,0) is about 7%, which means that plants with log productivity between -1 
and 0 account for 7% of manufacturing employment.   12 
Figure 8 displays one significant departure from the theory. In Figure 7, only firms with 
marginal cost below   enter and survive. Correspondingly, only firms with productivity above 
1/  should enter and survive. In practice, there are many other firm characteristics other than 
observable labor productivity that influence the decision to enter and continue operations. For 
example, in a dynamic model in which a firm’s factory depreciates over time (the factory is the 
fixed cost f of entering), a low-productivity firm may continue operating until it has run its 
factory into the ground. Thus, we will always see some low-productivity firms operating, but we 
will not see many of these. This shows up as the steep slopes to the immediate left of 0 in Figure 
8; in words, as productivity falls below median productivity, the number of plants drops 
precipitously.
26 
Market	 ﾠIntegration	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEntry/Exit	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
How does improved market integration affect this distribution? The Canada-U.S. Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) provides a great place to look because in many ways it is a perfect 
natural experiment. For one, the FTA policy experiment is clearly defined: it dealt only with 
market integration and was not part of a larger package of macroeconomic reforms that typically 
accompany trade liberalization. For another, it was unanticipated: a general election was fought 
on the issue one month before the FTA was to be signed into law and pollsters unanimously 
predicted that the ruling party – along with the FTA – would be defeated. See Brander (1991) 
and Thompson (1993). Finally, the FTA is the only major agreement between two developed 
countries that has been extensively studied. 
The FTA came into effect on January 1, 1989. Panel (a) of Figure 8 shows the 
distribution of plants both in 1988 (the last year before implementation of the FTA) and in 1996 
(when the FTA had largely been implemented and firm adjustments completed). The obvious 
feature of the panel is that the distribution of firms shifted rightward. Between 1988 and 1996 the 
share of low-productivity plants in manufacturing declined and the share of high-productivity 
plants rose. As we shall now see, this was largely due to the reallocation mechanism across 
plants that we outlined above. 
The first of these mechanisms that we examine is the fall in  , or equivalently, the rise 
in the break-even level of productivity. One can examine this mechanism by looking either at 
exit rates or at entry rates. A plant may not exit until it has completed the multi-year process of 
depreciating its fixed capital; in contrast, entry rates adjust quickly to shocks such as the FTA. 
Thus, entry-rate plots give a slightly clearer picture of the FTA-induced changes in the break-
even level of productivity. Panel (b) of Figure 8 displays entry rates for the pre-FTA period 
1980-1988 and for the FTA period 1988-96. There was a striking FTA-period decline in the 
entry rates of low-productivity plants. To use a sports analogy, in the pre-FTA period even the 
lowest-productivity plants made the cut and joined the team while in the FTA period such low-
productivity plants no longer made the cut.
27  
In terms of formal econometric analysis of how the FTA raised the productivity 
threshold, researchers typically estimate exit probits. (Entry probits are conceptually difficult to 
estimate.) Baggs (2005) and Baldwin and Gu (2006a) show that the FTA tariff cuts raised exit 
                                                 
26 Similar comments apply below to our discussion of the Figure 8(c) export threshold. 
27 Bernard and Jensen (1999), Trefler (2004), Lileeva (2008) and Lileeva and Trefler (2010) all point out 
that one must look not just at pre-FTA levels (as in Figure 8), but also at pre-FTA trends. All of the FTA results 
reported here hold with pre-FTA controls for both levels and trends. For example, variants of some of the panels in 
Figure 8 with pre-FTA trend controls appear in Lileeva (2008).  
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rates, as predicted in Figure 7. Further, the impact was large. Lileeva (2008) estimates that the 
FTA tariff cuts raised exit rates by as much as a whopping 16%, with all of the increase 
involving exit of non-exporters. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) find similar results for U.S. 
plants faced with U.S. tariff reductions.  
 
Trade	 ﾠCosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠExport	 ﾠDecision	 ﾠ
A central prediction of the theory is that in the presence of trade costs, only low-cost, 
high-productivity firms export (panel (a) of Figure 7). Panel (c) of Figure 8 shows the 
distribution of Canadian plants separately for exporters and non-exporters. The striking feature 
of the panel is that the distribution for exporters is to the right of that for non-exporters. This 
means that exporters are typically more productive than non-exporters, precisely as predicted by 
the model. Figure 8 is inspired by Bernard et al. (2003): their Figure 2 is the most important data 
display in international trade of the past decade. In the late 1980s, the average difference in 
productivity between exporters and non-exporters (after controlling for industry fixed effects) 
was about 40% for the Baldwin and Gu (2003) sample of all Canadian plants and about 10% for 
the Lileeva and Trefler (2010) sample of larger plants.
28 
29 
A much more demanding prediction of the theory deals with who will start exporting in 
response to falling trade costs. From panel (b) of Figure 7, new exporters are predicted to be 
more productive than the non-exporting population from which they came. To test this 
prediction, Lileeva and Trefler (2010) examined a sample of over 5,000 plants that had never 
exported prior to implementation of the FTA period. A very large percentage of these plants, 
40%, started exporting in the FTA period. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) then divide up this sample 
into quartiles of the 1988 distribution of labor productivity.
30 For each quartile, they calculated 
the percentage of firms that started exporting. Figure 9 displays these percentages. As predicted, 
we see that the plants that started exporting after implementation of the FTA were predominantly 
the more productive of the pre-FTA non-exporters: the probability of exporting among those 
non-exporters rises significantly with the plant’s relative productivity in 1988.
31  
In Figure 9 we assumed that the decision to start exporting was due to the FTA tariff cuts. 
One of the strengths of the approach in Lileeva and Trefler is that they have an excellent 
instrument for the decision to export. For each plant, Lileeva and Trefler constructed plant-level 
measures of the U.S. tariff cut experienced by each Canadian plant. This is done by attaching a 
tariff cut to each HS6 product produced by a plant and then by averaging over the plant’s 
                                                 
28 Since the seminal work of Bernard and Jensen (1995), a huge body of research covering dozens of 
countries has found that on average exporters are more productive than non-exporters. This was first confirmed for 
Canada by Baldwin and Gu (2003) and subsequently by Baggs (2005) and Lileeva (2008). 
29 The more critical reader will wonder why there are so many highly productive non-exporters and whether 
this contradicts the theory. A simple but prominent example explains why there is no contradiction. Highly 
productive auto parts plants often cluster around a giant auto assembly plant – Ford, General Motors, and Honda all 
have major auto assembly plants near Toronto, Canada that are surrounded by parts suppliers. These parts suppliers 
are highly productive, but do not directly export. This is clearly not a challenge to the theory: these highly 
productive plants are supplying parts that are built into autos that are ultimately exported to the United States: highly 
productive parts suppliers are ‘indirect’ exporters. 
30 In order to net out industry characteristics, the quartiles are defined separately for each industry. 
31
 In our model, profits play a key role in all mechanisms. Baggs and Brander (2006) confirm that profits 
move in the expected directions. In particular, they find that falling Canadian tariffs are associated with declining 
Canadian profits, especially for import-competing firms, while falling U.S. tariffs are associated with increasing 
Canadian profits, especially for export-oriented firms.   14 
products to generate an average tariff cut for the plant. This is a first in international trade and 
creates a very credible instrument, something that had been sorely missing in the literature. 
Using IV methods (the Local Average Treatment Effect by productivity quartiles), they show 
that exporting decisions were heavily influenced by the FTA tariff cuts. 
 
To recapitulate the results of this section, we have shown that in the wake of the Canada-
U.S. FTA, Canadian manufacturing productivity rose sharply. A significant portion of this 
productivity gain can be explained by the reallocation of resources across heterogeneous firms. 
First, it became tougher for low-productivity plants to enter manufacturing and more common 
for them to exit. Second, exporters were more productive than non-exporters and the FTA tariff 
cuts enticed the more productive of non-exporters into growing by becoming exporters.  
 
Quantifying	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGains	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠTrade	 ﾠDue	 ﾠto	 ﾠReallocation	 ﾠAcross	 ﾠHeterogeneous	 ﾠ
Plants	 ﾠ
Overall, Figures 8 and 9 provide strong evidence of the reallocation mechanism that is at 
the heart of the model presented above. Comparative advantage is alive and well at the plant 
level.  How important were these mechanisms for overall Canadian manufacturing productivity 
growth?  The answer is very important.  First, consider the reallocation effect: Trade 
liberalization induces the bigger more productive exporting plants to expand while 
simultaneously inducing contractions among the smaller less productive exporters.  This raises 
productivity by shifting market shares away from less productive firms towards more productive 
ones.  From Lileeva and Trefler (2010), we know the extent to which the FTA increased 
exporting. We can therefore calculate the impact of the FTA on the overall market share shift 
towards exporting plants.  Based on the productivity differential between exporters and non-
exporters in Panel (c) of Figure 8, this share-shift led to a 4.1% increase in the average 
productivity of Canadian manufacturing plants. 
While the U.S. tariff cuts promoted exporting by Canadian plants, the corresponding 
Canadian tariff cuts pressured some other Canadian plants to contract and even exit. This 
selection effect also generates overall productivity gains since the contracting and exiting plants 
(overwhelmingly non-exporters) were substantially less productive than the average Canadian 
manufacturing plant. Trefler (2004) estimated that this selection effect increased overall 
Canadian manufacturing productivity by 4.3%.
32 
Putting these numbers together, we see that the reallocation and selection effects induced 
by the FTA generated a productivity increase of 8.4% (= 4.3% + 4.1%) for Canadian 
manufacturing. This represents a massive productivity increase in just a short time – especially 
when one considers that this productivity gain did not come from productivity improvements at 
the plant level: it only came from the shifting of market shares from less- to more-productive 
plants.   
                                                 
32 Specifically, Trefler (2004) regressed labor productivity growth in the FTA period relative to the pre-
FTA period on U.S. and Canadian tariff cuts mandated by the FTA. He then showed that the Canadian tariff cuts 
raised productivity at the industry level, but not at the plant level. This means that the gains in productivity were 
coming from selection, rather than from improvements at the plant level. Using this approach, he finds that the FTA 
raised manufacturing labor productivity by 5.8% (t = 3.79) of which 4.3% was due to the exit associated with the 
Canadian tariff cuts.   15 
Canada is not the only country to have experienced such a substantial productivity boost 
from reallocations driven by trade liberalization.  Pavcnik (2002) studies the response of the 
Chilean manufacturing sector to a massive trade liberalization episode that took place from 
1979-1986.  She finds that two thirds of the ensuing 19% increase in productivity (another 
example of a massive increase in aggregate productivity) was generated by composition changes 
within industries due to a reallocation of market shares towards more efficient producers.  The 
surveys by Greenaway and Kneller (2007) and Wagner (2007) summarize the connections 
between trade liberalization and aggregate productivity (including this reallocation effect across 
heterogeneous firms) for a wide range of studies and countries. 
Rising	 ﾠWithin-ﾭ‐Plant	 ﾠProductivity	 ﾠ
Our empirical analysis so far has examined only those changes in average productivity 
that stem from the reallocation of resources away from less-productive plants and towards more-
productive plants (including the effect on exit). This is sometimes referred to as a ‘between-
plant’ effect. However, it is also possible that the FTA raised the productivity of individual 
plants, which is a ‘within-plant’ productivity effect. At least as far back as Schmookler (1954), 
we have known that the larger the market, the more profitable it is for firms to invest in 
productivity-enhancing activities. This is because firms in large markets have the large sales 
volumes needed to justify incurring the high fixed costs of innovation. The FTA-mandated U.S. 
tariff cuts effectively increased the size of the market faced by Canadian firms. It should 
therefore have promoted both increased exporting and increased investments in productivity-
enhancing technologies.   
If so, then at a minimum we should see that productivity rises when firms start exporting. 
There is now clear evidence of this. See Baldwin and Gu (2003, 2004) and Lileeva (2008) in a 
Canadian context, Van Biesenbrock (2005) for a subset of African countries, De Loecker (2007) 
for Slovenia and Lopez (2005) for a recent survey. More recently, Lileeva and Trefler (2010) use 
LATE techniques to establish a causal relationship running from exporting to productivity 
growth, a relationship that is driven by innovation.
33 We describe their results in more detail, but 
first start with a short extension to the theoretical model that captures how larger markets 
generate incentives for some firms to innovate. 
A	 ﾠTheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠMarket	 ﾠSize	 ﾠand	 ﾠFirm	 ﾠInnovation	 ﾠ
Consider a process innovation that requires an up-front fixed cost   and generates a 
reduction in marginal cost equal to !cI .
34 Consider the decision by a firm that produces q units 
of output to engage in innovation.  If this firm innovates, it will save q!"cI in lower production 
costs. This firm will weigh that cost saving against the fixed innovation cost , and innovate if 
the former exceeds the latter.  This implies that a firm will innovate so long as it produces 
                                                 
33 Bustos (2011), Aw, Roberts and Whinston (2007), and Aw, Roberts and Xu (2011) have also empirically 
connected exporting with increased innovation at the firm level.  See Burstein and Melitz (forthcoming) for a survey 
of the literature that incorporates exporting and firm-level innovation. 
34 For simplicity, assume that all firms have an initial marginal cost c above   so that the marginal cost 
of production after innovation,  , is positive for all firms. 
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q > fI /!cI I  units of output.  In other words, only the firms with large volumes q (i.e., those with 
initially lower levels of marginal cost) will find it profitable to innovate. 
What happens to this firm-level innovation decision when trade is liberalized?  The lower 
trade cost increases an exporter’s sales in the export market, and thus its overall output level q.  
For some exporters, this increase in output will tip the balance in favor of innovation. 
Empirics	 ﾠof	 ﾠWithin-ﾭ‐Firm	 ﾠProductivity	 ﾠGrowth	 ﾠ
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) look at the subset of 5,000 plants that did not export prior to 
1988 and divide these plants into those who started exporting in the FTA period and those who 
did not. In the raw data, those who started to export experienced a much higher rate of labor 
productivity growth in the 1988-1996 period. Specifically, their labor productivity rose 29% 
more than for non-exporters. 
Of course, this 29% does not take into account a potentially serious endogeneity bias: 
does exporting lead to increased productivity or does increased productivity lead to exporting? 
The FTA provides a perfect natural experiment for sorting out this causality. Using a LATE 
estimator with plant-level tariff cuts as instruments, Lileeva and Trefler (2010) establish that the 
FTA had a causal impact that raised the productivity of new exporters by 15.3%. This raised 
overall Canadian manufacturing productivity by 3.5%.
35 
Lileeva and Trefler (2010) then examine the sources of this productivity gain. It turns out 
that it can be traced back to investments in productivity. To investigate, the authors look at 
plants’ adoption rates of advanced manufacturing technologies and rates of innovation. They 
expect to find high adoption and innovation rates for those plants that had FTA-induced 
productivity gains from exporting. This is exactly what they find.  
Table 1 presents the results. Consider the first row, which deals with management 
techniques associated with Lean Manufacturing. In the period immediately after implementation 
of the FTA, 16% of new exporters adopted such techniques while only 6% of non-exporters did. 
The difference of 10 percentage points is mostly due to the FTA. This is shown in column 4 
where the instrumented (LATE) estimate attributes 7 percentage points to the effects of increased 
exporting due to the U.S. tariff cuts.  As shown in Table 1, similar results hold for other 
technologies and for innovation. 
Other evidence on innovation and exporting is reported in Baldwin and Gu (2004). They 
find that relative to non-exporters, exporters invest more in R&D and training, and adopt more 
advanced manufacturing technologies.  Also, Feinberg and Keane (2006, 2009) find that the 
1983–1996 increase in trade between U.S. multinationals and their Canadian affiliates was 
driven largely by improved logistics management, such as adoption of just-in-time production 
techniques. Such techniques appear in Table 1 as ‘Manufacturing Information Systems.’ 
A	 ﾠNew	 ﾠDimension	 ﾠof	 ﾠHeterogeneity	 ﾠ
One of the puzzles in Figure 9 is that so many low-productivity plants started exporting 
in the FTA period and that so much of this new exporting was directly due to the FTA tariff cuts. 
There is a second puzzle that we have not yet noted: The plants that gained most from starting to 
export (both in terms of productivity gains and increased innovation) were primarily plants that 
initially  had  low  productivity.  That  is,  among  plants  that  started  to  export,  the  benefit  was 
greatest for the least-productive plants.  
To see why, consider two firms with different initial productivities and suppose that both 
                                                 
35 These (5,000) plants accounted for 23% of Canadian manufacturing output and 3.5% (= 15.3% × 23%).   17 
are just indifferent between (1) exporting and investing and (2) doing neither. Indifference means 
that q = fI /ΔcI  or ΔcI = fI /q, where ΔcI is the reduction in marginal cost or the increase in 
productivity. The less productive of the two firms has lower sales q so that the firm’s 
indifference means the initially less-productive firm expects a larger productivity gain ΔcI from 
innovation.  Restated: Among the new exporters, the less productive the firm, the higher the gain 
from jointly exporting and investing. This is precisely what Lileeva and Trefler (2010, Table III) 
find. Among the new exporters, less productive firms experienced the biggest gains both in 
productivity and in rates of innovation/technology adoption. Thus, a simple modification of our 
original model can explain even such subtler features of the data. 
 
Summary	 ﾠof	 ﾠFTA	 ﾠEffects	 ﾠ
The reader will not be surprised to discover that there are other gains from trade 
liberalization associated with heterogeneous firms. Examples can be found in Blum et al. (2010) 
and Holmes and Schmitz (2010). In the context of the FTA, one last effect that has been 
examined involves the benefits to Canadian plants of improved access to U.S. intermediate 
inputs such as parts and U.S. capital goods such as machinery. The fall in the Canadian tariff 
enabled those plants to buy those inputs more cheaply and this contributed an additional 0.5% to 
Canadian manufacturing productivity growth. This effect of trade liberalization on within-firm 
productivity via cheaper intermediate inputs is typically even more important for developing 
economies.  For example, Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008) and Amiti and Konings (2007) measure 
substantial productivity gains for Chile and Indonesia, respectively, while Topalova and 
Khandelwal (2011) measure substantial productivity gains for India.  Goldberg et al. (2010) also 
report that India’s tariff cuts on intermediate inputs induced Indian firms to source previously 
unneeded intermediate inputs from abroad, intermediates that are now being used to develop and 
produce new products. 
We summarize the causal effects of the FTA on overall Canadian manufacturing 
productivity in Table 2.  The top section of the table lists the effects from the ‘between-plants’ 
reallocation mechanism that we mentioned in the previous section.  The bottom section of the 
table lists the effects of the FTA on productivity growth ‘within-plants’.  As we just described, 
there was a substantial innovation response by new exporters that contributed 3.5% to overall 
productivity.  Of course, new exporters were not the only plants to respond to the increased 
export opportunities.  Firms that had a history of exporting even prior to the FTA also responded 
to improved market access by increasing their innovation and productivity.  This contributed to 
an overall 1.4% productivity growth for Canadian manufacturing (Lileeva and Trefler, 2010). 
The last row of Table 2 shows that the grand total of our documented FTA effects is an 
increase in Canadian manufacturing labor productivity of 13.8%. The idea that a single 
government policy could raise productivity by such a large amount (and in such a short time-
span) is truly remarkable! 
Conclusions	 ﾠ
Recent research into the welfare gains from increased trade liberalization have focused on 
three sources of gains: (1) consumer gains from increased variety, (2) productivity gains at the 
industry level from shifting resources away from low-productivity firms and towards high-
productivity firms, and (3) productivity gains at the firm level from improved access to foreign   18 
markets. Each of these 3 mechanisms have proven to be highly important empirically in the 
context of the exhaustively studied Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, as well as in other less-
studied contexts. It is unfortunate that there are no other FTAs that have been so extensively 
studied as the Canada-U.S. FTA. However, Balisteri et al. (2011) have been able to show that 
adding firm heterogeneity to standard computable equilibrium models of trade raises the gains 
from trade liberalization by a very large factor of 4. Empirical confirmation of the gains from 
trade predicted by models with heterogeneous firms represents one of the truly significant 
advances in the field of international economics. 
In writing this review, we have focused on the gains from trade.  Yet, the model we have 
developed highlights how intra-industry trade will generate both winners and losers – just like 
inter-industry trade.  Particularly worrying are the implications for workers in the short-run. In 
the context of the Canada-U.S. FTA, Gaston and Trefler (1997) and Trefler (2004) show that 
there are large costs borne by workers in low-productivity firms. 12% of these workers lost their 
jobs. This result highlights the conflict between those who endure the short-run adjustment costs 
(displaced workers and struggling plants) and those who garner the long-run gains (consumers 
and efficient plants).  Clearly, this leaves an important role for policies that provide an adequate 
safety net for those affected workers.
36 
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Figure 1: World Share of Intra-Industry Trade 1962-2006 
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Figure 7: Export Decision and Trade Liberalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 8 – Panel (a) Labor Productivity Distribution of All Canadian Manufacturing Plants 
1988 and 1996 (employment weighted) 
 
Figure 8 – Panel (b) Labor Productivity Distribution of Entering Canadian Manufacturing Plants 
1980-1988 and 1988-1996 (employment weighted)  
Figure 8 – Panel (c) Labor Productivity Distribution of Exporters and Non-Exporters, 
1996 (employment weighted) 
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Figure 9: Share of Plants that Start to Export, by Initial Labor Productivity 
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Table 1: Innovation Response to FTA by New Exporters 
 
 
 
Selection/Reallocation (Between Plants) 
     Growth of exporters (most-productive plants)  4.1% 
     Contraction and exit of least-productive plants  4.3% 
Within-Plant Growth 
     New exporters invest in raising productivity  3.5% 
     Existing exporters invest in raising productivity  1.4% 
     Improved access to U.S. intermediate inputs  0.5% 
Total 
     Total  13.8%  
 
Table 2: Overall Effect of FTA on Canadian Manufacturing Productivity 